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 Chapter 4 
 National Immigration and Integration Policies 
in Europe Since 1973 
 Jeroen  Doomernik and  María  Bruquetas-Callejo 
 Introduction 
 Migration of workers and refugees has long been an integral part of the European 
continent’s history. Nonetheless, Europe’s appreciation of migration as a serious 
societal and governmental concern is relatively recent. Among the countries with a 
colonial history, migration became an issue at the time of the independence of these 
Asian, African, and South American nations. North-Western European countries 
furthermore witnessed sizeable labour migration from Southern Europe, Turkey, 
and Northern Africa. This occurred from the 1950s into the 1970s, though it was 
long considered merely an issue of labour supply and demand, and not one posing 
social or other challenges. Only after the economic recession of the mid-1970s did 
migration, or rather the restriction thereof, become a topic of debate. Integration of 
these migrant workers and their children is an issue that took longer to arrive on the 
political agenda. In some countries this happened from the late 1970s; in others it 
came about only decades later. 
 From the 1990s onwards, the European countries bordering the Mediterranean, 
which had primarily been suppliers of labour for the growing economies of North- 
Western Europe, themselves became attractive destinations for migrants. 
Improvements in their economies and living conditions opened the way for the 
arrival of considerable numbers of workers from Central Europe, Northern Africa, 
and Latin America. A precondition for membership of the (then) European 
Economic Community was enactment of stringent migration controls; hence inte-
gration issues long took a secondary place. 
 The Communist Eastern Bloc had been cordoned off from the rest of the world 
until 1989 and had thus seen very little migration since the end of the Second World 
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War. The main exceptions consisted of “guest workers” from socialist developing 
countries. These workers resided in isolation from the native populations. 
Vietnamese migrants remained and these days are a clear presence in the eastern 
parts of Germany and the Czech Republic. During the 2000s labour migration 
developed from farther east, such as the Ukraine, to Central Europe, while the 
nationals of these new destination countries themselves benefi ted in varying num-
bers from the freedom to go and work elsewhere in the European Union (EU). 
 From the early 1990s, refugees and asylum seekers became an issue of great 
urgency in North-Western Europe. Many states in this region felt overburdened and 
took steps to restrict asylum seekers’ access to their territories and to limit asylum 
seekers’ eligibility, thus shifting the burden to other member states. Since then, 
political consensus has emerged within Europe on the need for a joint approach 
towards asylum seekers and refugees, but so far national interests have persisted, 
and European solidarity on this issue has remained incomplete. More successful has 
been the development of EU-wide policies on migration for the purpose of family 
reunion and on the rights of long-term resident third-country nationals. EU law in 
the fi eld of general integration policies is not on the political agenda but the Union 
has made efforts to stimulate social cohesion and integration of immigrants and 
minority groups by means of “soft” law. 
 In short, European countries’ experiences with immigration have been diverse 
and related to geographical location, economic context, political history, and also to 
notions of nationhood, national belonging, and organization of government. Beyond 
these, European political integration has created an additional level of policy devel-
opment, supplementing and sometimes challenging national policymaking either by 
subsidizing local initiatives to foster the integration of immigrants which would 
otherwise remain unfunded (e.g., by national governments) or by limiting objec-
tives that are at odds with EU law (e.g., restricting nations’ power to limit the rights 
of third-country nationals). These issues are explored further in the next two sec-
tions. The fi rst addresses Europe’s four main types of migratory experiences. The 
second discusses the integration policies applied in the context of these experiences. 
The chapter seeks to clarify how the concept of integration is used in policy formu-
lation and policy practice, in line with the second question guiding this book:  What 
are the main factors driving the kinds of relations observed between local govern-
ments and immigrant organizations? 
 Immigration Experiences and National Policy Responses 
 Postcolonial, Labour, and Asylum Migrants 
in North-Western Europe 
 Among the fi rst immigrants that European countries witnessed in modern times 
were members of the colonial middle classes who came to the “motherland” to work 
or to study. Their numbers grew considerably when the colonies gained 
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independence. These members of the middle classes felt uneasy under their postco-
lonial governments or expected a more secure future upon resettling in Europe. 
Although at some point these European countries of destination imposed restric-
tions on such resettlement, it was generally understood that these migrants belonged 
to the nation and that the nation had a moral obligation towards them. Even though 
migrants still arrive from these countries as family migrants today, postcolonial 
migration was predominantly from the 1950s to the late 1970s. 
 In the 1960s, employers in countries including Belgium, France, Germany, 
Sweden, and the Netherlands recruited labour from abroad. Unskilled and semi- 
skilled workers were brought in for the service industry, construction, and manufac-
turing to meet the growing demands of the booming economies. At the same time, 
such jobs lost their attraction to native workers, whose educational levels were on 
the rise. The intention was to hire such workers on a temporary basis. With the 
exception of France, governments had no ambition to develop settlement policies 
(Martin and Miller  1980 , 316). The term “guest worker” was used to underline this 
stance. Once demand for guest workers ebbed as a result of the recession following 
the 1973 oil crisis, facts and conceptions took diverging paths. Further recruitment 
was halted—in Germany by law—and the guest workers’ return home seemed a 
logical consequence of the economic downturn. Yet a large share remained. Despite 
the recession, demand for their work remained sizeable (ibid., 320; Castles  1986 , 
765). Moreover, these workers themselves preferred to stay, as their countries of 
origin likewise were going through hard times. For their part, “host” governments 
were unable or unwilling to force their erstwhile guests to go home. Welfare arrange-
ments and entitlements were an additional disincentive for return migration. As a 
consequence, many guest workers became immigrants. Because this gave cause for 
spouses and children to join them, the end of the guest worker era actually meant the 
beginning of substantially larger migration fl ows. As a rule, governments did not 
applaud this ongoing migration of family members, but their ability to curb arrivals 
was restricted by humanitarian, economic, and legal obligations. 
 The example of the Netherlands illustrates this. Some 74,000 Moroccan and 
Turkish workers lived in this country in 1973, but ethnic communities ten times this 
size arose over the next 40 years (Doomernik  2011 , 73). In Germany the rise was 
less steep. While in 1973 the country had 910,000 Turkish inhabitants, in 2012 
some 3 million German residents had a Turkish background. 1 
 Over time, some governments acknowledged that continuing migration produced 
ongoing challenges in terms of integrating the newcomers into mainstream society. 
In no small part, this was a result of the nature of the recruitment policies, as they 
had been biased towards poorly educated migrants (Castles  1986 , 773). The bias 
towards those with little formal education also put migrants’ children in a disadvan-
taged position in education and, subsequently, the labour market (Crul and 
Doomernik  2003 ). This situation, in conjunction with an increased politicization of 
migration, brought about a growing interweaving of migration controls and integra-
tion requirements in countries such as Denmark and the Netherlands (from the late 
1  Data from Lederer ( 1997 , 47) and Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge ( 2012 , 138). 
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1990s on). Permanent residence was made conditional on the acquisition of  language 
profi ciency and knowledge of the host country’s law and society. Even though this 
touches all non-EU citizens, these measures were designed to target immigrants 
from former guest worker countries of origin. In general it can be observed that 
“immigration”, if not directly serving the interests of the receiving states, had taken 
on a negative connotation in public discourse. 
 During the 1990s, migration from the former guest workers’ countries became 
overshadowed—in numbers and in popular perceptions—by the arrival of large 
numbers of asylum seekers and refugees. In two senses this arrival resulted from the 
end of the Cold War. First, restrictions were removed on mobility from Eastern 
Europe to the rest of the world. Second, the end of the Cold War indirectly caused 
the disintegration of Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union. The former led to massive 
displacement and refugee movements. Many Bosnians ended up seeking security in 
Western Europe, especially in Germany, where they were given temporary protec-
tion. By 2005 the largest Bosnian populations in Western Europe were found in 
Austria, Denmark, Germany, Sweden, and the Netherlands (Valenta and Ramet 
 2011 , 4). Asylum migration from the fringes of the Soviet Union, especially the 
Caucasus, also became signifi cant, as did fl ows from Romania, Turkey, Iraq, 
Afghanistan, and from African states tormented by civil war and lawlessness 
(Castles et al.  2014 , 228). These asylum seekers did not end up more or less ran-
domly distributed among European states. They sought refuge predominantly in 
North-Western Europe, and within this region fi rst and foremost in Germany. 
Already in 1992 the German parliament saw itself forced to alter the constitution in 
order to severely curtail access for asylum claimants. The effect was a drop in over-
all numbers, yet it also created considerable spill-over of asylum requests into 
neighbouring states (Grutters  2003 , 165). This set in motion a dynamic by which 
countries sought to avoid being more attractive than others to asylum seekers, while 
also creating impetus for the integrated European approach that became part of the 
1997 Amsterdam Treaty. Joint policies were to take effect from May 2004 at the 
latest. 
 Meanwhile two further developments took on prominence. Firstly, among poli-
cymakers a new consensus gradually emerged about the demographic and economic 
contributions that selective labour migration might bring. In 2000, the German 
chancellor proposed seeking to attract information technology (IT) specialists by 
means of a “green card” (Doomernik et al.  2009 ). The scheme was unsuccessful, but 
the change in rhetoric did have impact. The German government established an 
expert committee to rethink the hitherto dogmatic position against signifi cant labour 
immigration. In other countries, such as the UK, France, and the Netherlands, soon 
thereafter similar schemes were devised, all geared towards attracting skilled for-
eign workers (ibid.). Some measured skill levels using the proxy of a high previous 
income (as did the UK); others applied human capital endowment measures (e.g., a 
university degree was used by France and the Netherlands). At the European level, 
too, this ambition found support and resulted in the joint Blue Card programme. 
 The second key development was the increasing dominance of irregular migra-
tion as a public issue. Here, North-Western Europe faced a particular challenge. 
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These countries had long been characterized by inclusive welfare systems that were 
also open to non-nationals, alongside highly regulated labour markets in which 
informal labour was outlawed. This implied relative closure to immigrants, whose 
contribution to the economy could not be guaranteed a priori. Restrictions, however, 
led to situations in which an alien, for instance, upon a failed asylum request, ended 
up without any state support, which is diametrically opposed to the essence of the 
welfare state. In order to avoid such paradoxical and politically troublesome situa-
tions, these states tended to devise measures against unsolicited arrivals. At the 
same time, lack of legal opportunities for unskilled immigrant workers encouraged 
illegal migration and unwarranted asylum requests. States in North-Western Europe 
tended to respond with increased detention of aliens and forced return measures 
(Doomernik and Jandl  2008 ). 
 From Emigration to Immigration in the Southern European 
Countries 
 Once North-Western European recruitment policies were discontinued in 1973–
1974 and the period of mass emigration from Southern Europe came to an end, 
Mediterranean countries began their gradual transformation to countries of immi-
gration. Changes were spurred by unprecedented economic growth and political 
stability brought about by the end of the dictatorships in Portugal, Greece, and 
Spain, as well as by the accession of these countries to the European Economic 
Community during the 1980s. Spain, Italy, Portugal, and Greece presented from the 
beginning particular patterns of migration and migration regulation that distin-
guished them from North-Western Europe (Baldwin-Edwards  1997 ; King et al. 
 1997 ; Arango and Finotelli  2009 ). The “Mediterranean model of immigration” 
(King et al.  1997 ) is characterized by a predominance of labour and family migra-
tion, a scarcity of asylum seekers, illegality as an endemic feature, and the combina-
tion of restrictive admission and citizenship policies with frequent amnesties. 
Migration to Southern Europe is closely related to its colonial past, linked to former 
African and Latin American colonies, and to the opening up of Central and Eastern 
Europe. Similarities in migration trends and policies among these countries must 
thus be seen in light of their common historical developments and analogous socio- 
economic conditions. 
 The start of immigration fl ows caught Southern European countries unprepared, 
lacking immigration experience and an adequate legal framework. Southern 
European countries reacted by developing policies to fence off immigration and 
established  ius sanguinis as the principle defi ning who belonged to the nation. Spain 
passed its fi rst foreigners law in 1985, pushed by the obligations acquired with its 
accession to the European Economic Community. The end of the Cold War and the 
gradual incorporation of Central and Eastern Europe into the EU migration system 
brought about a sharp increase of migration from Albania and the former Soviet 
Union to Italy and above all to Greece in the fi rst half of the 1990s. In that period, 
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policymakers across Europe shared a fear of an imminent “invasion” of Central and 
Eastern European migrants, which stimulated the introduction of stricter control 
and admission measures. It was in this spirit that Greece and Italy developed their 
fi rst alien laws, respectively, in 1991 and 1998. 
 From the mid-1980s through the 1990s, Southern Europe experienced a period 
of intense economic growth with substantial labour shortages in low-skilled sectors. 
This created a strong demand for migrant labour during a time of restructuring of 
the global economy, resulting in a remarkable increase of foreigners’ presence in 
Spain, Italy, Portugal, and Greece. Flows in Spain showed the most spectacular 
growth. The percentage of foreign population increased from 2.2 to 12.2 between 
2000 and 2010, according to National Institute of Statistics fi gures. Despite these 
large fl ows, the issue of migration remained relatively depoliticized until recently, 
with foreign workers generally perceived as contributors to the national economy 
(except in Greece). 2 
 As a result of the strong segmentation of the labour market that was characteris-
tic of these countries, migrants were incorporated in low-status, low-paid jobs that 
natives tended to reject. Typically, those sectors with a strong need for low-skilled 
labour fell within the large informal economy of Southern European countries, esti-
mated in 2002–2003 as 28.3 % of gross domestic product (GDP) in Greece, 26.2 % 
of GDP in Italy, and 22.2 % of GDP in Portugal and Spain (Schneider and Klingmair 
 2004 ). Other niches of migrant labour are closely associated with the features of the 
Mediterranean welfare regime, particularly the large informal market for domestic 
work and care-giving services, which employs primarily migrant women. Gradually, 
governments saw the need to regulate labour migration, with Spain being the fi rst to 
introduce a scheme based on a labour market test (known as the  Regimen  General, 
as established in the 1985 Foreigners Law), followed by Greece in 1991 with its 
invitation scheme. Ultimately, all four countries ended up introducing a system of 
annual quotas for labour migrants—representing all skill levels—Italy in 1990, 
Spain in 1993, Greece in 2000, and Portugal in 2001. These systems were a 
 forerunner of the current EU position that recognizes the need to open new legal 
ways to enter the EU given the crucial role that immigration plays in the European 
economy. 3 Implicitly, Southern European countries have bet on immigrants to main-
tain the low-productivity sectors that form the core of their economies (González- 
Enriquez and Triandafyllidou  2009 ). 
 At a certain point, governments acknowledged that migration recruitment proce-
dures were ineffective, as shown by the large presence of irregular migrants. To 
cope with the discrepancy between planned legal infl ows and the actual needs of the 
2  Data from the European Social Survey between 2002 and 2008 show that while Southern 
Europeans are reticent towards the entry of “many” immigrants they generally acknowledge that 
immigrants bring about positive consequences for their national economies (Moreno Fuentes and 
Bruquetas-Callejo  2011 , 162–165). 
3  In 2000, EU Commissioner for Justice and Home Affairs Antonio Vitorino declared that ‘new 
legal ways for immigrants to enter the EU’ were needed because ‘the zero immigration policies of 
the past 25 years are not working’ (cit. in Martin et al.  2006 , 74–75). 
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economy they have applied regularization programmes “ex post” with a certain 
degree of periodicity, though governments presented them each time as exceptional 
“one time only” measures (Arango and Finotelli  2009 , 31). Regularizations have 
been applied by governments of different colour, showing a considerable continuity 
in the policies of the main political parties in all four countries, despite rhetorical 
differences (González-Enriquez and Triandafyllidou  2009 ; Zincone  2006 ). 
However, by 2005 regularizations had become highly controversial among North- 
Western European partners who claimed that immigrants regularized in Southern 
Europe tended to move to Northern Europe to benefi t from the generous welfare 
systems there (Chauvin et al.  2013 ). Interestingly, research shows rather the oppo-
site effect: regularizations in Italy and Spain have “stabilized” a large part of the 
immigrant population (Carafagna  2002 ; Blangiardo  2004 ; Arango and Finotelli 
 2009 ; Cachón  2007 ). 4 In any case, from the mid-2000s, increased European integra-
tion has put more pressure on improving migration controls, and the European 
Council has agreed to limit regularizations to individual and ad hoc measures. 
 In sum, migration policies in the Southern EU member states have primarily set 
out to fi ght illegal migration. Massive migration fl ows to the Mediterranean coun-
tries occurred in a period combining restrictive policies and sizeable labour demand, 
and this partly explains why illegal migration is so predominant. 5 The four Southern 
European countries followed a similar path of policymaking: starting with the lack 
of an adequate legal framework for the infl ux of migrants, soon after adopting strict 
control measures, then establishing measures to manage migrant labour, and subse-
quently resorting to regularizations to “repair” ex post the poorly functioning 
recruitment procedures. 
 Due to the peculiarities of the Mediterranean model of migration, illegal migra-
tion poses other challenges to Southern European countries than to North-Western 
European ones. Illegal migration in Southern Europe is mainly a result of visa- 
overstaying or losing work permits, not illegally entering the country (Monzini et al. 
 2006 ; Arango and Finotelli  2009 ). Southern European policymakers are thus mainly 
concerned with how to handle large concentrations of irregular migrants while at 
the same time curtailing the shadow economy and collecting taxes and social secu-
rity contributions. From this perspective, regularization programmes seem to be 
win-win opportunities that transform irregular migrants into regular ones, making 
them taxpayers and social-security contributors. However, it leaves unresolved the 
question of how to prevent regular migrants from falling into irregularity when they 
have to renew their temporary residence permits and cannot prove they hold a for-
mal job. It also fails to tackle the informal economy, which created and reproduces 
the South European irregular migration system. 
4  In fact, an Italian study observed that Eastern European citizens such as Moldavians and 
Ukrainians who lived in Italy had obtained their visas in Germany (Colombo and Sciortino  2004 ). 
5 Arango ( 2005 ) summarizes the factors involved in the “equation of irregularity” as intensive 
fl ows, restrictive regulations, attractiveness of the informal economy, geographical proximity, 
weakness of controls, and effectiveness of smuggling activities. 
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 Central and Eastern Europe 
 During the decades in which Eastern and Central Europe were under Communist 
rule migration was a rare phenomenon. Insofar as it occurred, it concerned people 
leaving for Western countries. There were some highly publicized cases of dissi-
dents who managed to fl ee, and others who were forced into exile, but quantitatively 
much more important were the ethnic Germans who, by the thousands and year 
after year, left Poland and Romania to resettle in the German Federal Republic. 
Between 1950 and 1989 this led to the resettlement of, respectively, some 240,000 
persons. 6 After the end of the Cold War the former states of the Eastern Bloc were 
confronted with three challenges. The fi rst was emigration to Western and Southern 
Europe. Indeed, migration triggered the fall of the Iron Curtain. Almost as soon as 
the Hungarian government opened its borders to Austria in the summer of 1989 
large numbers of East Germans used this opportunity to travel to West Germany. 
Signifi cant also was that the Hungarian government had signed the Geneva Refugee 
Convention thus signalling that it would not return fl eeing foreigners to their coun-
tries of origin (because of the Convention’s prohibition against  refoulement ). The 
desire to move West did not diminish once all restrictions on departure had been 
lifted. The nature of the movements did change however. Fewer people settled 
abroad, and forms of brief mobility and temporary labour migration took on greater 
importance (Favell  2008 ). Until the 2004 accession of 10 new member states to the 
EU, much of this mobility was irregular. Afterwards, it became regular as part of the 
EU’s freedom of movement. Generally speaking, emigration from the new member 
states poses no policy challenges in countries of origin. The main exceptions are 
found in the Baltics. Upon independence in 1991, nearly half of Latvia’s population 
was of Russian origin. This fact made development of nationality policies unavoid-
able. These, in effect, transformed sizeable segments of the population into foreign-
ers, many of whom felt compelled to “return” to Russia or go elsewhere (e.g., Jews 
could opt for a future in Israel or Germany) (Doomernik  1997 ). Another conse-
quence of ethnic state-building in the Baltics was considerable governmental con-
cern about emigration of co-ethnics and ensuing attempts to formulate effective and 
inclusive diaspora policies that would ideally lead to their return once the nation’s 
economy had recovered from its crisis (Lace  2013 ). In Poland, too, maintaining the 
diaspora’s connection with the fatherland was viewed as a strategic political objec-
tive, as was the promotion of employment in the wider EU (Kicinger and Koryś 
 2011 , 367). 
 Secondly, immigration, be it of refugees or workers, until today has tended to be 
of minor political concern. In Poland, for instance, refugee numbers have been rela-
tively small (mainly people fl eeing Chechnya) whereas most other migrants arrive 
for work (OECD  2013 , 284). Moreover, with the exception of Hungary and the 
Czech and Slovak Republics net migration is negative, in Latvia and Lithuania even 
dramatically so (ibid., 271, 273). Early migration policies were, where needed, 
6  Own calculations based on Worbs et al. ( 2013 , Table 2.2). 
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fashioned on an ad hoc basis. Such policy responses were required towards the pres-
ence of de facto guest workers from (predominantly) Vietnam who had arrived dur-
ing the Communist era. These were typically granted leave to remain. There was 
also regional migration to regulate from the Ukraine, Moldova, Belarus, and the 
Russian Federation (ibid.), but few attempts at restriction were made. This changed 
once accession to the EU came into view, as Kicinger and Koryś ( 2011 ) show for the 
Polish case. Regarding third-country nationals, directives such as those on family 
reunifi cation, long-term residents, and refugees had to be turned into national law. 
Existing migration patterns (often of a temporary nature) from eastern neighbours 
were not easily reconciled with the EU logic of border management, especially the 
Schengen Agreement. But fi nally border commuting could be exempted from a 
strict implementation of the Schengen regime (ibid.). For labour migrants from 
eastern neighbouring states, simplifi ed rules were introduced in 2006 (exempting 
them from labour market testing) (OECD  2013 , 284). Most of these workers were 
employed in construction and agriculture (ibid.). 
 According to Čanĕk and Čižinsky ( 2011 ), reporting on the Czech experience, 
this happened somewhat naively and in the expectation that adopting the EU acquis 
would automatically mean the introduction of a comprehensive migration regime. 
However, the fact that this was not the case has not attracted much political atten-
tion. Since migration issues are not a salient political priority, and political parties 
lack distinctive positions and clear views about migration, migration policymaking 
has remained in the hands of specialized civil servants. 
 Among the Central European countries, fi rst and foremost the Czech Republic 
became an attractive destination for economic migration from Russia, Ukraine, and 
Slovakia (Drbohlav  2012 , 185). In the Czech case, increasing demand for migrant 
labour has been documented, especially in booming areas like Prague and Mladá 
Bolesvav, where some authors report that the social welfare system offers insuffi -
cient motivation for unemployed Czechs to seek work (Jíchová 2005 in Čanĕk and 
Čižinsky  2011 ). Like most countries in the region, the Czech government has 
aspired to attract highly skilled migrant workers by means of a special scheme 
(Doomernik et al.  2009 ). Success, however, seems to have been limited (Drbohlav 
n.d.). In 2011, 244 migrants made use of the Czech scheme; 80 % of these were 
Ukrainian nationals (OECD  2013 , 244). 
 Towards a European Approach to Asylum Seekers, Refugees, 
and Labour Migrants 
 With the Maastricht Treaty of 1992, migration and asylum were formally defi ned as 
a common policy concern. As noted earlier, at the time, asylum migration stood 
high on the political agenda of the EU’s North-Western member states. A fi rst step 
towards a common approach was to limit eligibility for protection to the fi rst safe 
country the asylum seeker set foot in. This principle became codifi ed in the Dublin 
Convention (and was later incorporated into the EU Treaty). In effect, this put the 
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obligation to receive asylum seekers on the member states at the EU’s periphery. 
Alternative mechanisms by which to achieve more even burden-sharing have yet to 
be developed. Presently, some member states are unable (notably Greece) or unwill-
ing (notably Italy) to abide by the agreements based on “Dublin”. At the same time, 
member states farther north consider the existing arrangements as satisfactory. 
Political solidarity between member states is thus not easily achieved. Instead mod-
est compensatory measures have been introduced to reward states for their efforts in 
accommodating refugees; the European Refugee Fund offers subsidies for their 
integration. 
 By 1997 political ambitions had progressed towards truly common policies in 
the fi eld of refugee protection, asylum, and migration. The Amsterdam Treaty con-
cluded that year (and coming into force in 1999) turned these issues into communi-
tarian ones, and the Commission was asked to propose a comprehensive approach. 
By 2004 this had led in the fi eld of asylum to directives on minimum norms regard-
ing asylum-seeker reception and asylum procedures and on common defi nitions of 
who qualifi ed as a refugee (which were recast in 2011). In many instances this 
simply permitted member states to continue existing practices. The Common 
European Asylum System (CEAS), as it is commonly referred to, gained new 
momentum from the publication in 2008 of the European Commission’s Policy Plan 
on Asylum. This sought to build on the European political consensus regarding the 
need for more practical collaboration, further harmonization, and increased solidar-
ity among member states. Yet, collaboration has since become most visible in 
increased border controls, the deployment of Frontex, and in 2011 the establishment 
of the European Asylum Support Offi ce in Malta. Prospects for a truly joint asylum 
system (i.e., having joint processing facilities and redistributive measures) remain 
beyond the present horizon (Thielemann and Armstrong  2012 ). 
 Arguably, a common European asylum system would be born out of managerial 
and political necessity. However, as already noted, when the Amsterdam Treaty was 
drafted, the political ambition was to go much farther and devise a comprehensive 
European migration regime. To this end, the European Commission produced an 
ambitious proposal in 2001 (COMM 757/2001) going in the direction of managed 
and forward-looking labour immigration schemes to fulfi l current and future 
demand and to curb irregular migration, human smuggling, and traffi cking. It found 
support in Southern Europe but much less up north. Indeed, in subsequent steps, the 
willingness among member states to surrender their sovereignty in the admission of 
foreign workers evaporated (if it ever had truly existed). 
 Nevertheless, some consequential directives are now part of EU law. A 2003 direc-
tive grants long-term residents the same freedom of movement as is enjoyed by EU 
nationals (after fi ve years of legal residence in one member state) (Council Directive 
2003/109/EC). Also concluded in 2003 is a directive on family reunifi cation (Council 
Directive 2003/86/EC) which determines the conditions under which third-country 
nationals can bring in their family members. In the subsequent years, this led to prac-
tices that were more liberal than some of the member states had intended. Coming 
into force more recently was the Blue Card Directive (Council Directive 2009/50/
EC), detailing common rules for the admission of highly skilled workers. It aims to 
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simplify and standardize admission requirements for skilled workers from outside the 
EU and to ease their mobility between member states. The idea here is to increase the 
EU’s competitive edge in the global competition for “brains”. Hence, it hardly chal-
lenges member states’ sovereignty (Doomernik et al.  2009 ). 
 Integration Regimes: Who Is to Integrate 
into What and by Which Means 
 Integration Policies in North-Western Europe 
 Since postcolonial immigration was generally understood as a collective inheritance 
and to comprise members of the nation, most North-Western European countries 
did not develop policies for the integration of migrants from the colonies. 7 
Nevertheless, in countries like the Netherlands, migrants were exposed to fi erce 
re- education programmes aimed at acculturating them into the mainstream. 
 Migrants arriving within post-war recruitment schemes were seen as “guest work-
ers” and therefore ideas about integrating them into society hardly surfaced. When 
they did, national reactions differed considerably. States varied in their basic concep-
tion of citizenship, which shapes the rules of belonging to the community. In Germany 
and other countries where membership to the nation is defi ned by descent ( ius san-
guinis ), permanent settlement of non-Germans was politically daunting and, on the 
part of the migrant, required many years of patience and almost complete assimila-
tion into society. Countries having a political defi nition of the nation provided easier 
admission of new members to the polity, as long as newcomers adhered to the con-
stitution, laws, and political rules. Among the countries that applied such an approach 
to integration, some, including France, required more cultural adaptation, while oth-
ers, such as Sweden, the UK, and the Netherlands, tolerated or even promoted a 
higher degree of cultural and ethnic diversity. Newcomers in France were considered 
‘individuals who had to disappear into the pre-defi ned political model by renouncing 
their own attributes—cultural, religious or otherwise—in the public sphere’ (Wihtol 
de Wenden  2011 , 67). In the UK, on the contrary, integration was offi cially defi ned 
as ‘not a fl attening process of uniformity but as cultural diversity coupled with equal 
opportunity in an atmosphere of mutual tolerance’ (Home Secretary Roy Jenkins, 
cited in Rex  1995 , 248). According to different ways of understanding citizenship 
and nationhood, European countries developed integration policies that have been 
coined “differential exclusionist”, “assimilationist”, or “pluralist”. 8 
7  The UK, for instance, in 1965 created the Race Relations Act which outlawed racial 
discrimination. 
8  Castles and Miller’s ( 1993 ) classifi cation of conceptions of citizenship as “republican”, “ethnic”, 
or “multicultural” is one of the most frequently cited. Recent criticisms challenge the usefulness of 
such national integration models (Thränhardt and Bommes  2010 ). 
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 The timing of the development of integration policies has also been infl uenced 
by such conceptions of citizenship. For states in North-Western Europe that relied 
on exclusive notions of nationhood, it took a very long time to acknowledge the 
permanent character of migration. In Germany, for instance, the presence of non- 
German immigrants remained ignored until 2001, when a government-appointed 
committee concluded that migration henceforth should be actively promoted. Other 
countries in the region recognized relatively early on that what had seemed to be 
temporary migration had turned into long-term settlement. They, hence, developed 
integration policies and sought to limit discriminatory effects of immigration law by 
offering ways towards rapid naturalization. Two countries that had formulated early 
responses towards the settlement of non-nationals were the Netherlands and 
Sweden. In the Dutch case, from 1980 onward the government pursued an active 
integration policy whereby the precise defi nition of who was targeted by the policy 
evolved in sync with overall societal evolution. Elsewhere, realization of the perma-
nent character of migrant settlement did not lead to formal integration policy; rather, 
integration was addressed under general welfare policies or shaped by less formal-
ized arrangements and implemented by non-state actors. 
 Even in states that adopted explicit integration policies, the general institutional 
framework shaped the socio-economic integration of immigrants. Particularly, the 
welfare regime (and the corresponding economic-industrial confi guration and type 
of labour market) together with immigration law have proven crucial for the posi-
tion of immigrants. While the residential and legal status of immigrants determines, 
directly and indirectly, their access to public welfare and to the labour market as 
long as they remain foreigners, the distinct welfare regime in place shapes both the 
opportunity of access and the form and extent of benefi ts (Dorr and Faist  1997 ; 
Morissens and Sainsbury  2005 ). The systems that provide more extensive coverage 
for immigrants are the universal ones that include the whole residential population, 
like those in Scandinavian countries and, in some policy areas, in other countries 
(such as old-age pensions in the Netherlands and health care in Spain and the UK). 
Insurance systems based on contributions during times of regular employment, typi-
cal of conservative-corporatist welfare states like Germany, France, and the Benelux, 
tend to exclude some migrant categories from benefi ts. Among the selective secu-
rity systems typical of liberal welfare states, such as the UK and Ireland, coverage 
for immigrants very much depends on the degree of governmental regulation of the 
market. 
 With time, some states that had previously excluded migrants from formal (i.e., 
legal) participation opened up by offering  ius soli and relaxed conditions for natu-
ralization, whereas others that were previously relatively open, started to become 
less inclusive in legal terms, matched by more assimilationist conceptions of “inte-
gration”. Obtaining permanent residency status has in some cases been made condi-
tional on fulfi lling such integration requirements. The Dutch pioneered testing of 
language skills before a visa is granted to spouses seeking to join their husband or 
wife in the Netherlands. Upon arrival, substantial language profi ciency must be 
demonstrated. Mandatory integration courses and contractual obligations to acquire 
basic language and cultural skills, fi rst developed by Denmark and the Netherlands, 
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have become widespread in this part of Europe (e.g., in France, Germany, and 
Austria), albeit not always aimed at the same segment of the immigrant population. 
In effect, admission and integration have increasingly become intertwined. 
 In spite of the relevance of the national level, local authorities and local actors 
across North-Western Europe have been and still are key in the formulation and 
implementation of integration policies. Even in the countries that developed highly 
centralized schemes, like the Netherlands and Sweden, the importance of the local 
level is undeniable, bringing about a distinctive view on integration oriented by 
rather pragmatic goals. This has sometimes led to open discontinuities or opposition 
between national and local policies. 
 Integration Policies in Southern European Countries 
 In Southern Europe, integration measures followed long after the attempts to regu-
late admissions and migrant labour. Italy launched in 1998 its fi rst migration law 
including integration; Spain did so in 2000, followed by Greece and Portugal in 
2001. Up to then Southern Europe’s management of migration resembled in many 
ways that in Northern Europe during the guest worker period in the 1960s. Despite 
the fact that immigration to Southern Europe was neither mediated nor planned by 
the receiving states, a labour-oriented approach prevailed in which immigration 
control and labour regulation were the main priorities and integration was relegated 
to a second place (Bruquetas-Callejo et al.  2011 ). This explains the economic con-
ception of migration that guides Southern European policies, in contrast to the 
humanitarian-oriented commitment that still weighs heavily in North-Western 
European policies (Finotelli  2009 ). In this view, regularizations are legitimized as a 
mechanism allowing the legal inclusion of formally unwanted (irregular) immi-
grants, provided that they enhance the utility of immigration for the receiving coun-
try’s economy and society. Above all, those who contribute positively to the 
countries’ economies become the Mediterranean answer to the question of who 
should be integrated. 
 Characteristic of Southern European countries is that integration policies have 
been elaborated from the bottom up, starting with local and regional initiatives in 
the 1990s. Policies diverged from city to city and region to region. Since the turn of 
the millennium, we have witnessed in all countries initiatives to produce national 
frameworks of integration in an effort to coordinate the policies produced at sub- 
national levels. Greece and Portugal have been relatively successful in this regard, 
with national plans that are managed in a more centralized way than those in Spain 
and Italy. Moreover, EU initiatives and fi nancial instruments (e.g., the European 
Social Fund and European Integration Fund) have promoted the application of inte-
gration projects initiated by immigrant organizations, nongovernmental organiza-
tions (NGOs), municipalities, and universities. The outcomes of these EU 
programmes for the promotion of the social and economic integration of immi-
grants have been positive though limited (Triandafyllidou  2009 ). 
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 Southern European countries have continued to think of themselves as emigration 
countries (Zincone  2011 , 390), which is refl ected in their more open integration poli-
cies. With the exception of Greece, Southern European countries are very inclusive in 
legal terms, especially towards migrants with a cultural or ethnic link. Regular immi-
grants in Southern Europe have access to basic rights (e.g., work, welfare services, 
health care, and education) on equal footing with natives, while irregular migrants’ 
access depends on local authorities’ will and the discretionary practices of street-level 
bureaucrats (González-Enriquez and Triandafyllidou  2009 ; Moreno Fuentes and 
Bruquetas-Callejo  2011 ). Spain is a case in point, as since 2000 irregular migrants 
registered in the municipal census have been entitled to basic social rights such as 
health care, education, and welfare allowances, although with the reform of the health 
care law in 2012 (Royal Decree 16/2012) health care rights were restricted to foreign-
ers legally residing in the country and contributing to the social security system. 9 
 As a consequence of their labour-oriented approach to migration, immigrant 
integration in Southern European societies takes place mainly through labour mar-
ket insertion. Typical of the Mediterranean welfare regime, Southern European 
countries offer coverage for unemployment and old-age pensions proportionate to 
labour participation and contributions to the social security system. This contribu-
tive logic, which is also common among the conservative-corporatist systems of 
North-Western Europe, usually implies that foreign-born citizens have less cover-
age since they tend to hold temporary jobs. Similarly, their old-age pensions tend to 
be less, since most immigrants have contributed to the social security system for 
fewer years. Thus, Mediterranean welfare states are characterized by a combination 
of contributive and universal schemes. While immigrants are entitled to universal 
benefi ts in areas like health care and social services, the amount of other benefi ts 
(e.g., basic income allowances) is linked to contributions, meaning they tend to be 
more meagre than those of the native populations. 
 This also means that the process of integration is less directly mediated by 
explicit policies of integration but rather by immigrants’ agency and interaction 
with local network and clientelistic relations that structure the labour market and 
interaction with the state in Southern Europe (Triandafyllidou  2009 ). Immigrants 
fi nd their local niches of life and work and take part in local life and networks 
regardless of their legal situation. Nevertheless, as we read above, the segmentation 
of the labour market determines that migrants are incorporated in the less protected 
segments and often in very precarious situations. 
 Moreover, immigrants are tolerated to reside and work in these countries but are 
generally seen as outsiders, not belonging to the nation even after many years of resi-
dence. Restrictive citizenship policies in Southern Europe make naturalization espe-
cially diffi cult. Third-country nationals in Italy, Greece, Spain, and (until 2006) 
Portugal are required to have resided in the country at least ten years in order to apply 
for naturalization. Yet, for immigrants who can prove ethnic descent or colonial ties, 
naturalization is relatively easy, creating two differentiated roads to integration. 
9  Then again, regional governments are in charge of implementing this, which leads to variation. So 
far, several regions have publicly declared that they will not implement this reform. 
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 Southern European societies produce a different answer to the question of who 
should be integrated. Contrary to the North-Western European situation, Southern 
Europeans are rather tolerant to irregular immigrants (González-Enríquez and 
Triandafyllidou  2009 ). This can be explained by the prevailing labour migration 
rational, as well as the roles played by various actors. The Catholic Church in three 
of the four countries, for example, has lobbied for soft policies towards irregular 
migration (while in Greece, the Orthodox Church has not played an important role). 
Trade unions, too, have adopted a cooperative stance towards immigrants. While the 
middle classes provide a broad base of social support (partly due to the services that 
migrants provide for them), there are negative feelings among low-skilled workers, 
since their salaries and labour conditions have been affected by the arrival of 
immigrants. 
 Integration Policies in Central and Eastern Europe 
 The former Eastern Bloc countries still have relatively small numbers of migrants 
from third countries. Foreign-born residents are most prevalent in the Czech Republic 
at 3.8 %, whereas in Poland only 1.2 % is foreign-born (Vasileva  2011 ). For Hungary 
the fi gure is 4.4 %, but includes many ethnic Hungarians who resettled from neigh-
bouring countries. Accordingly, throughout Central Europe little has been done in 
the design of national integration policies (Dbrohlav  2012 , 196). In fact, the incipi-
ent policy initiatives in this fi eld are largely EU-driven. Central European countries’ 
accession to the EU pushed them to develop policies in this area, despite their scant 
migration fi gures. This has implications for the policies produced, since launching 
integration policies in countries where there are relatively few migrants is an abstract 
process, and EU policymaking applies only soft measures. 
 In Poland, for example, integration policies have so far been limited to asylum 
seekers, while other categories of migrants are covered by scattered European- 
funded initiatives. Poland’s ratifi cation of the Geneva Convention in 1991 afforded 
it international recognition as a democracy; therefore, refugee protection has 
become the most important area of integration policies (Kicinger  2009 , 91). 
Integration policies are being articulated in the Czech Republic too, and updated 
yearly, with policy initiatives stressing both the acquisition of rights by foreigners 
and immigrants’ acquisition of the Czech language and basic civic knowledge 
(Barsová and Barsa  2005 ). Since 2009, language tests have been introduced as a 
requirement to obtain permanent residence status. In addition, the government has 
since 2011 established regional integration centres where third-country nationals 
and refugees can fi nd practical support. The government explicitly mentions its reli-
ance on European resources (e.g., the European Integration Fund) to fund these 
centres and their activities. Writing about Poland, Stefanska ( 2011 ) asserts that 
without such EU funds, integration measures would be absent. 
 A number of these states recently reformed their naturalization laws to facilitate 
the legal inclusion of migrants. In the Czech Republic, for instance, fi ve years of 
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legal residence presently suffi ces to attain Czech citizenship. This is more liberal 
than the naturalization laws in Poland and Hungary. In these latter countries, respec-
tively, ten and eight years of residence is the standard requirement, while more 
relaxed conditions apply for spouses of nationals and refugees. A refl ection of the 
growing importance of migration in the Czech Republic is that from 2014 forward, 
naturalization will no longer require relinquishing one’s original nationality. 
 Top-down processes of policymaking such as those promoted by EU funds may 
lead to inconsistencies, piecemeal policymaking, and a growing need for develop-
ment of a more comprehensive integration system. In Poland, introduction of a 
comprehensive policy is under discussion (Pawlak  2015 ). In the Czech Republic 
responsibilities for integration policymaking are being concentrated in the 
Department of Asylum and Migration (Čanĕk and Čižinsky  2011 ). In Central and 
Eastern Europe, overall, development of comprehensive integration policies takes 
place against the backdrop of the transformation of the communist regime. As any 
process of such deep institutional change, this transition constitutes both an oppor-
tunity for introducing new policymaking and a challenge, because brand new poli-
cies must grow in an institutional framework full of incongruities. Above all, there 
is a fundamental inconsistency in the logic of Central European economic and wel-
fare institutions by which ‘neo-liberal economic institutions coexist with outdated, 
malfunctioning distributive institutions, which are fundamentally socialist in nature’ 
(Szelenyi and Wilk  2010 , 583 in Pawlak  2015 ). 
 Conclusion 
 Obviously, we do not know what directions migration and integration regimes in 
Europe would have taken if these topics were still the sole domain of national gov-
ernments. Perhaps they would have converged anyway as a consequence of other 
macro developments. In any event, a fi rst general observation that can be made is 
that migration regimes have become similar, and where EU acquis rule, even identi-
cal. These developments have secured the position of third-country nationals and 
provided for uniform rules regarding family reunifi cation. In other cases, however, 
convergence has not taken place along the lines of equally shared interests or fair 
compromise, but rather the concerns of the old EU-15 member states, particularly 
the North-Western ones, have set the tone. This has resulted in restrictive measures 
instead of burden-sharing in the EU’s joint dealings with asylum seekers and refu-
gees, to the dislike of Southern European members. With the exception of highly 
skilled migration, joint labour migration policies have not materialized. Furthermore, 
EU accession has forced member states that previously had relaxed (or few) migra-
tion policies to take controls seriously. 
 Convergence is furthermore in evidence when it comes to integration regimes. 
Countries that initially had multicultural policies have gradually developed poli-
cies with an assimilationist slant. There is also evidence of countries going in the 
opposite direction: from ethnically justifi ed exclusion to more openness towards 
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ethnic diversity. Those member states for which the immigration experience is 
fairly fresh do not tend to have comprehensive approaches towards settlers from 
third countries. Integration policies instead tend to be a local matter, often stimu-
lated by EU funding. In effect, where national political agendas are less inclined 
towards the support of immigrant integration, these can be bypassed by municipal 
governments. In Central and to some extent Southern Europe, integration is not 
necessarily on the national political agenda to begin with. Indeed, it fi nds expres-
sion mainly in networks such as Integrating Cities, Intercultural Cities, CLIP (the 
European Network of Cities for Local Integration Policies for Migrants), and 
ECCAR (the European Coalition of Cities against Racism), which receive subsi-
dies from a European Commission programme for the integration of third-country 
nationals. Because these networks bring together a large number of cities to work 
together and share practices, much of the resulting integration dynamic appears to 
be local. 
 This brings us to a third trend (and a fi nal question): not only in new countries of 
immigration but also in the older member states, local governance appears to be 
rising in importance. As also noted by others (e.g., Barber  2013 ; Saunders  2010 ) 
migration is predominantly an urban affair, and local governments are keenly aware 
of the opportunities and challenges resulting from it. At the same time, at the 
national level political responses to migration can be critical, and at times downright 
unfriendly. This may prompt local policymakers to look elsewhere for support, for 
example, to the EU. Whether this actually undermines the importance of the national 
level in dealing with such sensitive issues as national identity and belonging is still 
an open question.
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